VIDEO: M.K. Narayanan wants to destroy Tamil Diaspora's unity.

Anti-Tamil policy maker and India's national security advisor , M K Narayanan, turns his eye on Tamil Diaspora

It is no secret that Narayanan's policies and advice have caused genocide of several thousands of Eelam Tamils and destruction of Tamil homeland from the 80's.

Addressing Director Generals and Inspector Generals of Police Monday, India’s National Security Advisor and one of the architects of Indian Establishment’s policy towards Eezham Tamils, M K Narayanan, told them of the need to keep watch against Tamil diaspora reviving the LTTE and cautioned them to be prepared for any eventuality. “The funding lines of the LTTE are still intact and there is always a possibility that disgruntled elements in the Tamil diaspora across the globe could get together to help the terror outfit regroup and rearm,” said M K Narayanan, according to The Economic Times, Tuesday. His fear stems from his own policy 'haunting him back,' commented Tamil circles in the diaspora.


M K Narayanan“Narayanan’s policies designed to serve the thinking, ‘human beings cannot forgive,’ has caused the genocide of several thousands of Eezham Tamils and the incarceration of hundreds of thousands. The policies have put India for the first time in the list of uncivilised countries of the world. They have made India isolated in the event of attacks by her traditional enemies. They have made the people of a big state in India to simmer with anger,” points out a Tamil journalist in Colombo.

India behind Lanka's victory : Book

The Sri Lankan president, Indian PM and senior government ministers of both countries have repeatedly denied causing a single civilian death in what the government had desginated a "no-fire zone."

"It is most sure that the numbers without limbs are over 20,000. Most of the injuries causing loss of limbs were from shelling," he said. The doctor alleged that conditions in the camps for displaced people around Vavuniya, are poor and that malnutrition and disease are rife.

"We were all gathered together recently by the government and we were told that if we told the figures of the sick and why people are dying to the foreign NGOs that we will be killed for doing this."






The army dismissed that figure as an exaggeration and repeated the Government’s assertion that not a single civilian was killed by government forces in the final assault on the northeastern conflict zone.
Sri Lanka faced new calls for a war crimes inquiry after an investigation by The Times revealed that more than 20,000 civilians were killed – mostly by the army – in the last days of the war against the Tamil Tigers.

VIDEO : Unlock the Camps in Sri Lanka - Campaign by Amnesty International


Even as it publicly refused to give Sri Lanka any offensive weapons for the war against LTTE, India had a "hidden hand" in the success of the island nation's campaign over the terrorist outfit, says a new book.

Although in the initial days he was advised to seek a negotiated settlement with the Tamil Tigers, New Delhi saw merit in Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse's argument that the LTTE was only biding its time to regroup and rearm itself and that war was inevitable sooner than later, says Sri Lanka, From War to Peace, by journalist Nitin Gokhale.

Defence and Strategic Affairs Editor with a television news channel, Gokhale covered the 33-month Eelam War in Sri Lanka.

The Mi-17s that India 'quietly gifted' to Lanka were in addition to a Sukanya class offshore patrol vessel also gifted by the Indian Coast Guard to the Sri Lankan Navy in 2002. The choppers played a major role in several daring missions launched by the Sri Lankan Air Force to rescue the army's deep penetration units and injured soldiers from deep inside LTTE-held territory, the book says.

"Hampered by domestic compulsion, New Delhi could not go beyond such meagre and clandestine transfer of military hardware. Publicly all India was willing to acknowledge was the supply of low-flying detection "Indra" radars to the Sri Lankan Air Force since this equipment was considered a defensive apparatus," the author says.

Gokhale quotes senior Sri Lankan army officers saying that thanks to the Mi-17s, the soldiers operating behind enemy lines functioned with a greater degree of confidence since they knew these choppers were always at hand to come to their rescue whenever necessary. This surely was the key factor in our Special Forces delivering spectacular results.

Not wanting to annoy its Tamil Nadu allies like the DMK unnecessarily, New Delhi had a 'politically most important message' conveyed to Colombo to try and conclude the war against the LTTE (called Eelam War IV) before the summer of 2009 when India was expected to hold the general elections, Gokhale says.

"The Rajapakse regime was nothing if not shrewd". Aware of dynamics that determined India's Lankan policies, it was also conscious of India's anxiety in losing strategic space in Sri Lanka. The Rajapakse brothers were pragmatic enough to realize that Lanka needed India's support in war against the LTTE, total support from China and Pakistan notwithstanding".

Colombo could ignore India but only up to a point, the author says.

So Mahinda Rajapakse hit upon an idea of an informal exchange mechanism between New Delhi and Colombo. He nominated both his brothers - Basil (MP and Presidential advisor) and Gotabaya, the Defence Secretary along with his own secretary Lalith Weeratunga.
India too reciprocated immediately. The Indian team comprised National Security Advisor M K Narayanan, Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon and Defence Secretary Vijay Singh.

Colombo may have been ambivalent about meeting Indian requests to end the operations before the general elections but the Sri Lankan leadership once again gratefully acknowledged the Indian Navy's contribution in locating and destroying at least 10 'floating warehouses' owned by the LTTE that were used by the Tigers to store arms, ammunition and even armoured personnel carriers.

Well-coordinated operations by the two navies between 2006 and 2009 actually broke the backbone of the Sea Tigers, Gokhale says.

Also, under an agreement between the two countries, the Indian Navy and the Coast Guard frequently sent out ships to patrol the Palk Strait and the Gulf of Mannar. Presence of warships and Indian patrol vessels acted as firm deterrence against the Sea Tigers, the book says.

The book also notes the transformation of the Sri Lankan Air Force and Navy into lethal forces that played vital roles in victory over the LTTE. "The Sri Lankan Air Force had indeed come a long way from its inglorious days in the 1990s when it lost three aircraft to the LTTE's ground fire in the assault on Jaffna".

"What is not so well known is that the Sri Lankan Air Force jets almost killed Prabhakaran in one of the air raids on his hideout in Puththukudirippu. But as luck would have it, Prabhakaran had left the base minutes before the bombs rained on the target," the book says.

Gokhale also says that if the Indians quietly helped the Sri Lankan Navy transform itself, the Lankan Air Force got a big boost from the Chinese and the Pakistanis. Pakistani personnel helped the Lankans in training and maintenance while the Chinese supplied them with vital equipment at a critical time. The Chinese gifted four F7 GS fighter planes which are the most sophisticated jets in Sri Lanka's arsenal today with in-built air interception radar and carry four heat seeking missiles, he said.

After a successful campaign against the LTTE, President Rajapakse's biggest challenge would be to win the peace by sparking reconciliation between its majority Sinhalese and minority Tamil ethnic populations, healing a rift that looks unbridgeable, Gokhale says. Rajapakse will have to restore to their homes and livelihoods some 300,000 Tamils in the North who fled the fighting only to be housed in camps.

"President Rajapakse and his team must avoid triumphalism to spoil the enormous goodwill that they have earned by winning the war. They must ensure that the death of one Prabhakaran does not lead to birth of another. Therein lies Mahinda Rajapakse's test," the book says.

“Narayanan now seems to realise well that despite going against all sensibility, the policies have not brought in any positive results in resolving the crisis in the island and are not going to bring in any solution in near future. His lack of confidence that his policies would concede political justice to Tamils is what causes the fear that is very similar to that of the Colombo regime,” the journalist commented.

“While keeping Tamils incarcerated, India is now engaged in grabbing land and economic interests in the Tamil homeland, and in dictating Tamil political leaders to accept formulas of subjugation. Narayanan’s statement reflects the paranoia of an aggressor and it only indicates that a continued partnership of Colombo and New Delhi, refusing Tamil national aspirations, is going to escalate the crisis in the island,” observed diaspora Tamil circles.

According to them what is needed is a simple political move from India: recognition of the sovereignty of the Eezham Tamil nation and its self-determination in the island. This would put everyone at ease, would expedite democratisation of the situation and would pave way for wider regional and global cooperation.

Meanwhile, apparently concerned over Chinese incursions into Ladakh, Narayanan convened a meeting of the China Study Group, last Thursday. The cabinet secretary, secretaries of defence, home and external affairs, chiefs of the three armed forces and chiefs of intelligence outfits attended the meeting.